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Tsang Shu-ki and Cheng Yuk-shing 
1. Introduction 
The phenomenal link -up between the Hong Kong and Guangdong economies has been 
proceeding at a remarkable speed since the launching ofthe Chinese economic reform in late 1978. 
The process has largely been market-driven and seems to suit the short-run comparative aqyantage 
on both sides. In essence,. however, it has been a result of a reallocation of resources across the 
border, made possible by China's open policy. It has not yet led to a benign form of developmental 
upgrading which embodies the strengthening of the long-tenn foundation for productivity and 
competitiveness enhancement. lndeed, the tremendous "windfall profits" obtained so far could be 
regarded as a disincentive for R & D investments as well as beneficial decisions that may incur 
painful side e直認ts in the short run. 
Problems which are structural and developmental in nature, including bias and duplication 
in production pattems, inflationary pressure, widening income inequality, and the loss of 
competitiveness, have emerged in both Hong Kong and Guangdong. These problems could be 
traced to the lack of countervailjng forces that promote far-sighted strategies, vis-a-vis "short-
termism" driven by market supplies and demands and yearly profit maximization. 
In this paper, we argue that while better coordination should be pursued to ensure mutually 
beneficial developments and to avoid duplication in efforts and undesirable convergence in 
industrial structur郎， the future trajectories of the two economies will not and cannot be identical 
Hong Kong and Guangdong are different in size and endowments, and face dissi~lar political and 
economic frameworks. Independent policies and measures to nurture specific advantages and to 
solve intemal problems have to be made. lndeed, a certain distancing in economic relations 
between the two economies will be healthy. 
11. China's open policy and structural change in Hong Kong 
A decade or so after 1978, the Pearl River Delta of the Guangdong province became 組
important hinterland of Hong Kong's manufacturing industries. This form of economic linkage 
between the two places has totally altered the development path of Hong Kong. ln the 1960s and 
the 1970s, Hong Kong experienced a process of rapid export -led industrialization. A large labour-
intensive manufacturing sector was established. ln the second half of the 1970s, however, Hong 
Kong was troubled by the problems of rising costs, external market constraints, and the pressure of 
technological upgrading. The Hong Kong government, which had been proud of its commitment 
to economic laissie faire , realized that something had to be done. The Committee on lndustrial 
Diversification was set up in 1977 with an objective to study what strategies Hong Kong should 
adopt to tackle the escalating problems. 
Two years later, in 1979, the Committee suhmitted a report to the Hong Kong government. 
The timing was indeed ironica1. As soon as China opened its door in the same year, the whole 
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thinking about climbing the technological ladder and diversi月ring products and markets was de-
railed. Literally un1imited supply of labour, asking wages at less than 10% of the on-going rates in 
Hong Kong, became available in southem China. Similar bargains existed in land, energy and other 
charges. Even without technological upgrading and industrial diversification, this new-found 
advantage was su伍cient to propel the Hong Kong economy forwards for many years to come. 
In retrospect, if China had not implemented the “open door" policy, Hong Kong might 
have been forced to go along the tr句ectory of technological upgrading of the other three “Asian 
Tigers" (Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea). lnstead, what has happened is a massive relocation 
of manufacturing industries to the Pear1 River Delta and a further expansion of the labour-intensive 
industries. Up to now, 3 to 5 million workers in Guangdong are reportedly working directly or 
indirectly for Hong Kong, compared with the total work force of about 3 million in the territory 
itself 
The immediate implication of this "transformation" is the release of a great deal of 
manpower to other sectors. On the other hand歹 export processing of Guangdong has boosted the 
demand for Hong Kong' s transport and trading services. Since the development of transport and 
other services of China has been lagging behind the rapid expansion of trading actívities, China' s 
reliance on Hong Kong to provide re-export and financial services has grown. 
The industrial restructuring, or de-ind俯身的liz，αtion， of Hong Kong has proceeded with full 
force. In 1980, manufacturing accounted for 23 .7% of GDP in 1980, while the service sectors 
took up 67.5%. ln 1995, the former's share fell to 8.80/0 as the latter's rose to 83.80/0 (see Table 1) 
ln terrns of employment, Table 2 shows the dramatic changes. ln 1980, the manufacturing sector 
employed over 900,000 persons. The number had fallen below 400,000 by 1995. That the 
manufacturing workforce of an economy could be halved within the horizon of a decade must be 
one ofthe records in wor1d economic history. 
To critics, however, it also reveals that employment ín the territory has largely been non-
sector -specific in nature. It reflects rather poor1y on the skill level that has been required in the 
major sectors. To put it dramatically, anyone here can be a textile worker in one month, a salesman 
in another, and a property agent in yet another. Trus does not au伊r well for the long-run prospect 
of productivity enhancement, wruch requires specialization, professionalization, and accumulation 
of expertise in specific areas. It adds weight to the skeptical view that the Hong Kong economy is 
still ravelling in the bonanza of the China factor for cost reduction and "re-rating" by intemational 
investors and speculators. No serious efforts in industrial and technological upgrading have been 
petfonned 
Table 1 Production-based GDP at current prices by economic activity 
(unit: 010) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
Agriculture and tìshing 0.8 0.5 0 .3 0.1 
Mining and quanγlng 0.2 0.1 # # 
Manufacturing 23 .7 22.1 17. 6 8.8 
Electricity, gas and water 1.3 2.6 2 .3 2.3 
Construction 6.6 5.0 5.4 4.9 
Wholesa1e/retail, importJ export 
trades, restaurants and hotels 21 .4 22.8 25 .2 27 .4 
Transport, storage and 
commurucat1ons 7 .4 8.1 9.5 9.8 
Financing, insurance, real 
estate & business services 23 .0 16.0 20.2 24.9 
Community型 social and 
personal services ] 2.] 16.7 14.5 17.1 
Ownership of premises 8.9 10.5 10.6 12.7 
A句ustment for tìnancial 
intennediation services 
indirectly measured -5 .4 -4.6 咀5 . 5 -8.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Hong Kong Govemlnent, Estimates 0/ Gross Domestic Product 1961-1996, 
Table 11 
Note: # - insignificant share. 
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Table 2 Employment by IndustηGroup 
(persons engaged) 
1980 1985 
扎1anufacturing 902,521 859,648 
(46.5) (39.6) 
Wholesale/retail, import! export 
trades, restaurants and 
hotels 441 ,892 588,040 
(22.8) (27.1) 
Transport, storage and 
commurucatlons 74,109 94,560 
(3.8) (4.4) 
Financing, insurance, real 
estate and business services 123 ,883 177,346 
(6.4) (8.2) 
Other industrial sectors 396,767 453 ,330 
(20.5) (20.9) 
1990 
741 ,366 
(30.1) 
805,411 
(32.7) 
129.551 
(5 .3) 
270,610 
(11.0) 
517,107 
(2 1.0) 
December 
1995 
375,766 
(14.9) 
1,018,198 
(40.6) 
172,174 
(6.9) 
378,244 
(15 .1) 
564,314 
(22.5) 
Sources: Quarter~v Report 01 Employment, Vacancies and p，句;roll Statistics, various 
lssues 
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent percentage shares of the total 
血 The strengthening of the Hong Kong-Guangdong linkage 
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In the opening up of China, it is natural that Hong Kong rapidly increased her linkage with 
the Guangdong economy, given the latter's geographical and sub-cultural proxinlÍty. Table 3 shows 
the relevant trade figures 
Table 3 Imports and Exports of Hong Kong and Guangdong 
5 
(Unit: US$ 100 million) 
(1) Total exoorts of GuanQdonQ 
(2) Exports of Guangdong to Hong Kong 
(3) (2)1(1) 
( 4) Total imports of Guangdong 
(5) Imports ofGuangdong from Hong Kong 
(6) (5 )1(4) 
(7) Total Imports of Hong Kon立
(8) (2)1(7) 
(9) Share of Hong Kong imports from China 
(I O) Total Exports ofHong Kon日
(11) (5 )1(1 0) 
(12、 Share of HonQ KonQ exoorts to China 
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Source: Guangdong Stαtistical Yearbook, 1994, 1995; Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, 
vanous lssues 
As can be seen from the table, China's shares in Hong Kong's imports and exports 
amounted to about one-third in 1992-94. Guangdong、 s shares, ranging between 7% and one-
fourth, increased very fast during those years. Also, the figures indicate that as much as 70%-85% 
of Guangdong' s imports and exports were transacted directly or indirectly through Hong Kong 
Apart from trading, investment across the border 企om either side also expanded 
tremendously. Hong Kong has been China's largest “outside" investor, contributing over 60% of 
the inf10w ofinvestment capital. At the end of 1993, a total of 167,500 foreign-invested enterprises 
(Fllis) were set up in China. Among them, 106,914 or 63 .8% were 企om Hong Kong. Ranked in 
terms of the total number of foreign-invested enterprises attracted, the best-performing ten 
provmces in China were, from top down: Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Fuji妞， ZhRjiangp
Shanghai, Hainan, Liaoning, Beijing, and Tia吋in. The number of foreign-invested enterprises in 
Guangdong amounted to 44,705, which represented 26.7% ofthe national total. 1 During 1990-94, 
the pledged and the actual amounts of utilization of foreign capital of Guangdong totalled US$ 
90.12 billion and US$ 30.57 billion respectively. Of the amounts, Hong Kong constituted US$ 
71 .42 billion (79 .20/0) US$ 22 .41 billion (73 .3%) respectively 
On the other hand, mainland China' s investment in Hong Kong has also been increasing at 
an impressive rate. As Table 4 shows, by 1994, China's cumulative stock of direct investments in 
Hong Kong accounted for about 18% of total foreign direct investments in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors and ranked third in value after the UK and Japan, followed by the US. The 
inf10w of capital 企om Guangdong has been very important. In October 1994, the total market value 
of the shares of Guangdong Enterprises (Holdings) Limited, which was listed in Hong Kong's 
1 Jingji yangjiu cαnkao (Economic Research Reference Material), Beijing, China, 120ctober.1994 
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stock market, amounted to HK$ 8.81 6 billion (US$ 1. 141 billion). On 30 November 1994, it 
became one of the component shares of the Hang Seng Index, reflecting its rising status. 
Table 4 N et Assets Attributable to Inward Direct Investments 
in Manufacturing and Non-manufacturing Sectors in 1994 
Value (HK$bn) 
M句or
lnvestor country Manufacturing Non-manufacturing Total 0/0 share 
UK 
Japan 
China 
US 
Others 
Total 
Sources: 
2.97 203 .1 206.07 28.2 
14.74 136.4 15 1. 14 20.7 
4.23 129.8 134.03 18 .4 
11.80 75.9 87.70 12.0 
10.23 141. 1 15 1.33 20.7 
43 .97 686.3 730.27 100.0 
Industry Department, Hong Kong Government, 1994 Survey of External 
Investments in Hong Kong; Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong 
Government, Externallnvestments in Hong Kong's Non-lnanufacturing 
Sectors. 
The rapid strengthening ofthe China-Hong Kong or Guangdong-Hong Kong 
economic ties has profound impact on Hong Kong. According to the estimation of the 
Economic Research Department of Hang Seng Bank, the contribution of the "China factor" to 
Hong Kong' s GDP rose from 5.3% in 1980 to 25 .70/0 in 1990.2 Given the trend ofincreasing 
linkage in recent years, the share probably has risen to over 30%. 
IV. Emerging problems in Hong Kong 
With the big push of the "China factor" , Hong Kong has sustained a respectable 
growth rate and experienced drastic changes in its economic structure. However, some 
problems are noteworthy. First, the growth rate has still been dec1ining. In the 1970s, average 
annual growth in real terms ofHong Kong's GDP was as high as 9.2%. In the 1980s, it was 
7.5%. During 1990-95, it slipped to only 5.5%. One explanation ofthe declining growth rate 
often invoked is the slowing down of the growth of the labour force. The average annual 
growth of the locallabour force in the 1970s and the 1980s was 4.2% and 1. 7% respectively. 
During 1990-95, however, it actual1y revived to a yearly rate of 2.2%, as local demographic 
factors, returned migrants and increased in-takes from China generated re1ative1y more labour 
supply. 
2Hang Seng Bank, Hong Kong, Hang Seng Economìc λ1onthly， June 1993. 
". l 
If we scrutinise the issue more carefully, we can observe some wonying trends. The 
annual growth of per capita GDP in Hong Kong during ] 980-89 averaged 5.5%. It fell to 
3.8% in 1990-95. Ifwe further examine the statistics ofGDP per worker, we find that the 
respective growth rates in the two periods were 5.7% and 3 .3 %. These figures suggest that, 
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prima facie , there have been some problerns with Hong Kong' s productivity. The Hong Kong 
economy should not have become “mature" so quickly 
The availability of cheap labour from Guangdong has no d9~bJ .helpedwfI.9.!lg Kong's 
manufacturing industries to lower production costs. It has also , ir羽K~~lly ，Jl alì訊設ed the 
pressure for Hong 足9ng to upgrade technology and to improve productivity. As a sudden 
I '~/widening of the hirìi釘land leads to a drastic reduction of labour and related costs, the 
incentives to invest in R&D and to adopt advanced techniques can hardly become visible . This 
is particularly true when short-term protìts are huge and the authorities are not taking any pro-
active measures to induce long-term optimality. '.幻守主叭
1n a way, the Chinese reform has rendered Hong Kong' s consideratÏon to upgrade its 
industry suþé的uous. To Hong K.ong, it is similar to an unexpected discoverγofa new gold 
mine or an oil field . How to make use ofthe “windfall profit" of such a discovery is crucia1. If 
the “windfal1 profit", for instance, is not used for reinvestment in productive activities that can 
raise Hong Kong' s long-term advantage, but instead channelled into the pursuit of further 
short-term profits, asset inflation and consumer inflation wi I1 then accelerate. As a result, 
operation costs in Hong Kong will be pushed up. The sectors that cannot generate “windfall 
profit" in the short run (e.g. high-tech industries in their formation stages) will encounter 
heavy pressure and eventually be crowded out. The economy will inevitably suffer from the 
phenomena of “ho J1owing out" or the “Dutch Disease" . 3 
Whether “hollowing out" or the “Dutch Disease" will occur or has already emerged in 
Hong Kong is debatable. 1n any case, there are some noteworthy trends. First, it appears that 
Hong Kong manufacturers have not used the huge profits that have been earned in Pearl River 
Delta for investment in technological upgrading. The profits are either used for “extensive 
expansion", that is, building more factories of the same (or even somewhat lower) 
technological level in cheaper localities in southern China, or repatriated to Hong Kong for 
investment in non-manufacturing or even non-productive, speculative, activities 
Conventíonal \visdom has it that the Hong Kong economy has undergone a “structural 
traosformation" towards higher status: narrlely from a manufacture-based to a service-based 
economy, presumably with larger value-added. Such a characterization is in our view 
misleading. 1n the textbook case of development economics, such a transformation is a result 
oftechnoiogical eohancement and a rise in productivity. 1n the process, hun1an as well as 
other resources in the traditional sector are released and allocated to the growing sector. The 
developmeot of the latter in turn 丘lrther facilitates the productivity growth of the traditional 
3Por a survey 00 the literature of the "Dutch disease", see W.M. Corden, "Booming Sector and 
Dutch Disease Economics, Survey and Consolidation", Oxford Econom;c Papers, Vo l. 36, 1984, 
pp.359-380. 
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sector. A virtuous circle wi l1 thus be formed, with falling employment in the traditional sector 
and rising employment in the leading sector 
The so-called structural transformation of the Hong Kong economy is quite different 
from this kind ofupgradiog. What has happened is more a change in the regional division of 
labour and some of its derived consequences. Originally, the mobility of resources 
(particularly labour and capital) between China and Hong Kong was very low. Once China 
adopted the open-.door policy, most of the barriers to resource flows were lifted . The new 
mode of division of labour, often called qian diαn hou chαng (the shop at the front, the factory 
at the back), thus emerged. Obviously, Hong Kong is the diαn (shop), and southern China is 
the chang (factory). Since production costs differ a lot across the border, a large amount of 
benefits can be reaped from the simple relocation of industries by both sides. This simply 
reflects the operation ofthe law of static comparative advantage. 4 
The side-effect is however a significant reduction in the pressure 00 technological 
upgrading. The technological sophistication ofHong Kong' s manufacturing industries 
(including their off-springs in the Pearl River Delta) has been lagging behind their competitors 
in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. What Hong Kong is still relying on is low production 
costs in its hinterland 
Moreover, I-Iong Kong has been faced with the problem of “relatively low growth and 
relatively high inflation" in recent years. Real economic growth has been about 50/0 , but the 
consumer inflation rate has been double-digit or close to double-digit for quite some time. As 
for asset inflation, the situation has been worse. During 1991-93 , the prices of residential 
property rose more than one time. It did not fall until the government introduced a series of 
measures to cool down the market in early 1994. 1n any case, the prices and the rental rates of 
real estates in Hong Kong are among the highest in the world. Certainly, with the upward 
trend in China' s economic power and international status, Hong Kong as a stepping stone is 
stiU an attractive site to invest. Even Chinese capital has been flowing into Hong Kong in 
huge amounts. AJl these phenomena have contributed to I-Iong Kong' s high in f1ation; and the 
ways that Hong Kong businessmen have utilized their “windfall profit" have also added to the 
price pressure. The rising price level then serves to push up production costs and crowd out 
unprofitable industries in the short term. Even the profits of the service sector have been 
eroded. Some of the services have been moving northwards or outwards 
Third, Hong Kong has witnessed a worsening distribution of incomes. Table 5 shows 
some relevant figures . 
4可For an earlier a仰na叫ly戶S1βs of the lack of long-term productivity en凶1吐由h組C臼en1en叫1t in the so called 
"冶S泣tructωura叫1 transf必01口m官na剖仙ti昀Oαn" in the Hong Kong economy, see Tsang Shu-ki, "Inflation" , ηle Other 
Hong Kong Report 1992, The Chinese University Press, pp .425-445 . 
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Table 5 Changes in household income distribution in Hong Kong 
Jncome {!fOUn Inω且e sbare (溢〉
19.2l l.976 19.&J 1.9.&.6 19S1.l lqq的
Lowest auintile 6.2 5.4 4.6 5.0 4 .3 3.7 
2nd quintile 10.2 10.1 9.8 9.8 9.0 8.2 
3rd quintile 14.3 14.9 14.3 14.0 13.5 12.7 
4th quintile 20.0 20.1 20.9 20.5 20 .4 19.1 
Highest quintile 49.3 49.5 50 .4 50.7 52.8 56.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(3lllL.C..O己所cie.nt Ü..A.3 Ü..A.3 QASJ Q 坐5.3 Q.A16 。有 lR
Seen from changes in the quintile distribution of income and the Gini coefficient, there 
ha's been a secular trend of increasing inequality. The situation worsened notably during 1986-
96. Indeed, Hong Kong' s distribution of income is the most unequal among the 
countries/areas of similar development levels.5 The reasons are manifold. First, as the income 
distribution in the service sector is more dispersed, an increase in Hong Kong' s inequality is in 
a way "iüitural" in its move towards a “ service economy". On the other hand, although the 
economic ties between Hong Kong and China have benefitted both sides, the distribution of 
the benefits among recipients is highly uneven. The major beneficiaries have been the Hong 
Ko i1g enterprises which have invested in China, followed by local authorities, enterprises and 
workers in Guangdong. As to employees in Hong Kong who work in sectors that do not have 
c10se ties to China, they have not benefitted much from the process of economic link-up. 
Moreover, many in the atfected sectors (e.g. mid-aged skilled manufacturing workers who 
have been replaced by their much cheaper counterparts further north) have been disadvantaged 
and have suffered from a fall in real incomes, or outright unemployment 
v. Economic development and resource f10w in Guangdong 
Guangdong' s economic performance since the launch of the open policy has been very 
impressive. During 1979-93 , Guangdong's GDP registered an annual average growth of 
13.9% in real terms, much higher than the national average of 9.3 %. Apart from the efforts of 
Guangdong itself, the central policy of letting Guangdong "go one step ahead of other 
provinces" as well as the geographical proximity factor (lying along the coast and 
neighbouring Hong Kong) have also helped. 
Similar to the case of Hong Kong, China' s open policy has facilitated resource mobility 
and regional division of labour between Guangdong and other places in the country. The on]y 
ditference is that while Hong Kong has moved factories to Guangdong to make use of its 
cheap labour( Guangdo時 has instead absorbed a la眼 amount of labou的s from other 
5See Tsang Shu剖， "Income Distribution" ， 刃le Other Hong Kong R只port 1993, The Chinese 
University Press, pp.361-368. 
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provinces. 1n the early 1990s, according to estimates, the labourers coming from other 
provinces to work in Dongguan and Baoan totalled 1.4 million. 6 Some other reports say that 
there are already over 10 million "outside" workers in Guangdong, although more official 
sources put the figure at 7-8 million. Thus, Hong Kong has exported factories, capital, 
technologies and outside connections to Guangdong. At the same time, Guangdong has 
imported labourers from other provinces, many ofwhich are working in Hong Kong-invested 
plants. ) 
As far as labour is concerned, Hong Kong is more reliant on Guangdong than 
Guangdong is on other provinces. A popular estimation of labourers working in Hong Kong-
invested factories in Guangdong is about 3 million , which is already larger than the totallabour 
force in Hong Kong. From another angle, total employed labour in Guangdong amounted to 
34.3391 million in 1993.7 1fthe report of 10 million “outside" workers in Guangdong is 
accurate, the share of “outside" worker in total employment is significant, but not to the extent 
ofHong Kong's external reliance. 
均hy 
f、 Besides， taking "first mover" advantage and making use of its special status, 
Guangdong has absorbed quite a significant amount of capital and investment from other 
provinces, which has contributed to its economic growth) One key piece of evidence is the 
change in the deposit-loan gap in Guangdong's banking system. At the end of 1985, bank 
loans exceeded deposits by Rmb 19.482 billion, equivalent to 64 .1 % oftotal deposits . 1n end-
1990, the gap fell to Rmb 12.602 billion, or 11.0% oftotal deposits. More notably, 
outstanding loans became less than deposits in Guangdong' s banking system since April 1991 
onwards. For the whole financial system in Guangdong (including all non-bank :tìnancial 
institutions) as a whole, total loans have been less than total deposits since June 1991. At the 
end of 1992, deposits in the banking system exceeded loans by Rmb 56.304 billion, the gap 
representing 23.7% of total deposits. This change reflects not only the increase in the 
available capital in Guangdong itself, but also the inflow of capital from other provinces. 
A、J-F 
尸
Nevertheless, the supply of outside capital to Guangdong does not seem to have been 
very stable. After China had adopted the macro-control measures in mid 1993 , large amounts 
ofthe “hot money" in real estates, stock and futures markets were withdrawn. Tens ofbillions 
yuan were repatriated back to their home provinces. The financial situation of Guangdong 
deteriorated dramatically. Deposits declined sharply, giving rise to some liquidity problems. 
At the end of 1993 , the positive deposit-loan gap in Guangdong's banking system fell to Rmb 
24.839 billion, which was only 10.00/0 oftotal deposits (compared with 23 .7% a year ago) 
The situation did not stabilize until the second qua此er of 1994. 
On the whole, the rapid economic development of Guangdong after 1979 has been a 
result of a large increase in factor mobility. A huge amount of short-term profits has been 
6Yang Ming, "Yaoyou quanxin di silu, zhengce he tizhi" (Completely New Thinking, Policy and 
System are needed), Gang-Al所ngji (Hongkong-Macau Economics), N 0.7, 1992, pp. 17-18 
7Guangdong Tongji Nianjian 1994 (Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1994) 
generated by this kind of factor mobility. IIow to consolidate the development and to derive 
reliable long-term advantage will be a big challenge to Guangdong in the future 
VI. Characteristics and problems of Guangdong's economic structure 
Similar to Hong Kong, the impressive economic growth record in Guangdong has 
arisen frorn a regional relocation of resources, more than genuine technological upgrading. 
Short-term benefits, therefore, coexist with potential long-term difficu1ties. The problems, 
moreover, are largely structural in nature 
First, on the whole, the externallinkage of Guangdong is much stronger than its 
internallìnkage. In other words, the industrial sectors inside Guangdong have rather weak 
inter-connections among themselves. There has been little coordination of production 
amongst varjous sectors inside the province. Production in various sectors in fact is 
predominantly dictated by the external market. On the basis of the input-output table of 
11 
Guangdong in 1987, it has heen estimated that the multipliers ofthe industries (the increase in 
the output of the whole economy resulting from one dollar's inÇ.rease in the output of a 
particular industry) in Guangdong only ranged from 2.3 to 3. 2(, which implies a rather loose 
岫ge b伽een the in側的、 \ 
Second, there has been a convergence in the output structure of various production 
centres in Guangdong. ( The implication is that cities and tovvnships in the province are 
increasingly engaged in similar production activities (in particular labour-intensive expo此
processing), with li忱 divlsion 0仙。叭nd co叫削叫T枷 6 1ists 伽 resu1ts of a 
comparative study of the functional structures of cities in some major provinces in China 
conducted by Dai Hez凶， a geographer from Shandong. Eleven economic functíons , measured 
in terms of per capita output vaJues of specific sectors, are examined. A city is said to be 
specialìzing in one function if its per capita output value of that function is higher than the 
provincial average. If a city is found to be specializing in more than one functions, the 
function with the highest above-average output value will be chosen. Moreover, the 
desìgnated specialized function must rank in absolute output terms among the top four in the 
city. If a city does not have any specialized function , it is then classified as a “general city" 
8Zhou Jianhua, "Zhujiang sal!jiaozhou jingji fazhen I的igui yu qia呼叫1" (Review and Prospects of 
the Economic Development of the Pearl River Delta), in Zhongshan University (ed.), "Zhujiang 
sa旬的ozhou jingji 戶zhen huigui 川 qza旬的月" (Review and Prospects of the Economic 
Development of the Pearl River De1t成 Zhongshan Universíty Publishing House, 1992, pp. 22-37 
/' 
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Table 6 A comparison of the economic functions of cities in major provinces in China 
Economic fu11ctions Shandong Liaoning Jiangsu ~h~iagg Hebei Guangdong Henan Sichuan 
N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N 
b也ning 2 3 15.0 2 7.7 4.0 3 5.3 4 15 .4 2 
Electricity 2 5.9 5.0 2 4.0 2 5.3 3.8 2 
。
Metal1urgy T I 2.9 2 10.0 3.8 2 8.0 2 8.7 。 0.0 3 11.5 
Petro-chemica1 2 4 20.0 2 7.7 2 8.0 2 5.3 3.8 2 
lC叫ct…terial 。 。。 3 4.0 4.3 5.3 2 7.7 3 
Machinery aIld electronics 4 11.8 5.0 2 I 7.7 3 12 .0 4.3 5.3 2 7.7 5 
Textiles 4 11.8 2 10.0 3 4 16.0 2 8.7 2 10.5 3 11.5 2 
Paper -mak:ing 2.9 5.0 。 0.0 O 。。 。 。。 5.3 I 3.8 
Foods 2 。 。。 3.8 2 8.0 2 2 10.5 4 15 .4 4 
Transport, pos旭geand
telecommunications 2.9 。 0.0 3.8 。 。。 。 。。 。 0.0 O 0.0 。
Commerce and catering 。 。。 5.0 。 0.0 。 0.0 。 。。 5.3 3.8 
General cities 15 44.1 4 20.0 7 26.9 9 36.0 8 34.8 8 42.1 4 15 .4 。
'-----
Notes: N represents the number of cities and P the percentage share ín the total number of cities 
Source: Dai He泣止 “A study of the s仕ucture of the city system ín Shandong," Jingji dili (Econornic Geography), Vol. l4 , No.2 , 1994, p. 29 . 甘le results are 
computed with figures published ín Zhongguo chengshi tongji nianjian 1991 (China Statistical Yearbook of Cities 1991) 
P 
8.7 
8.7 
4.3 
8.7 
13.0 
21.7 
8.7 
4.3 
17.4 
0.0 
4 .3 
。。
As shown in Table 6, among the 19 cities in Guangdong, eight or 42.1 % are “general 
cities" . The share is the second highest among the eight provinces under examination. It i臼S 
j戶u叫川S剖t山巾b忱枷e
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Another simple indicator t出ha前t can show the convergence in the output structure of various 
Guangdong cities is the index of r昀eg♂lona叫1 divergence used by Paul Krugma組n， which is defined as: 
I ilsi -s*1 
where SI is the share of industry i in the total manufacturing output of a city and SI* is the share of 
industry i in the total manufacturing output of the whole Guangdong province.9 The index ranges 
企om 0 to 2 and a higher value indicates a bigger difference between the average (provincial) output 
structure and that of the the city under investigation. If, on average, the manufacturing struc仙re of 
the cities has become c10ser to the average (provincial) structure, we can say that( there is a 
convergence in the structure.) Here we utilise the data of 40 manufacturing industìies in 18 
Guangdong cities (prefectures) to determine whether there had been a convergence or a divergence 
of the lnanufacturing structure between 1988 and 1994.10 As shown in Table 7, out of the 18 
cities, nine registered a decrease in the index of regional divergence. The average of the index for 
the 18 cities decreased 企om 0.713 to 0.663 , implying an increase in the convergence ofthe output 
structure 
The problem of the convergence in the output structure probably has not been fully 
reflected in the above index, as it is based on aggregate data of forty industries. Anecdotal reports 
show that the duplication of the investments in some specific industrial products has been very 
serious in the Pèar1 River Delta. F or instance, most cities have their own production factories for 
air -conditioners and there are a total of 30 such factories in the Pear River De1ta. On the other 
hand, there are 250 cement factories in the De1ta, 860/0 of which have small production capacity of 
less than 200,000 tons. As for the automobile industry, as many as 97 enterprises had been 
established by the end of 1993. ( There has been litt1e coordination among the cities in the 
development of伽叫1dustm 11 7 
9 See Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade , The I\位T Press 1991 , pp.75-76. Note that Paul 
Krugman uses share of employment while we use share of output in computing the index 
10 The data are available in the Guangdong tongji n均可ian (Guangdon Statistical Yearbook), 1989 
and 1995 
11 Zhang Nan, "'Zhu San Jiao' gongye chanye jiegou qutong de xianxiang yu duice (The current 
situation of' the convergence of the industrial structure in Pearl River De1ta and policy 
prescriptions)", Zhujiang sa旬的ozhou jingji (Pear1 River Delta Economy), NO.1之 1996， pp.47-48 
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Table 7 Index of regionaI divergence 
1988 1994 
1 Guangzhou 0.391 0.3 85 
2 Shenzhen 0.751 0.754 
3 Zhuhai 0.686 0.484 
4 Shantou 0.522 0.613 
5 Shaoguan 0.923 1.007 
6 Heyuan 1.000 0.751 
7 Meizhou 0.702 0.765 
8 Huizhou 0.670 0.700 
9 Shanwei 0.978 0.695 
10 Dongguan 0.580 0.546 
11 Zhongshan 0.540 0.448 
12 Jiangmen 0.435 0.469 
13 Foshan 0.505 0.587 
14 Yangjiang 0.878 0.806 
15 Zhanjiang 0.662 0.731 
16 孔1aoming 1. 152 0.949 
17 Zhaoqing 0.542 0.522 
18 Qingyuan 0.908 0.714 
Av立盤空 0.713 0.663 
The weak internal linkage and the low level of specialization in Guangdong are not 
fnecmdyab仙恤g. This kind of phenomena may merely 叫e叫le openness of Guangdong 
With a strong outward linkage, Guangdong needs not worry much about the intema1 division of 
labour. By responding prompt1y to extemal market signa1s, huge profits can already be earned. 
The operational mode of "the shop at the 丘。此， the factory at the back" in the Hong Kong-
Guangdong linkage has been a major factor leading to this structure of “ strong external linkage, 
weak intemallinkage, and low specialisation". Moreover, in the process of export-oriented labour-
intensive industrialisation, Guangdong's competitiveness has largely been based on low production 
costs and preferential policies from the cent叫 government. Within a certain period of time, 
coordination of internal production was therefore not relevant. 
Yet, there are doubts whether this kind of extemal linkage can be relied on as the only 
momentum of growth for very long. The pertinent questions are: should the mode of extemal 
linkage (the shop at the 企01前， the factory at the back) be upgraded? If yes , in this process of 
upgrading, should internal linkage and coordination of production within Guangdong be 
strengthened? Should regional division of labour and cooperation be promoted and improved? 
The last question brings us to the third structural characteristic of Guangdong' s economic 
development: regional imbalances. 1n 1978, the gross 叫ue of industrial and agricultural output of 
the Pearl River De1ta constituted 32.7% ofthe provincial tot址 The share rose to 57.6% in 1990 
and 68.7% in 1994. 1n contrast, the share of the mountainous areas, which constitutes 60% of total 
land area and 40% of total population, fell 企om 16% to 13 .4% during 1978-1990. Interestingly, 
the share increased to 15.6% in 1994. Whether this was the resu1t of a shift in government policy 
15 
to a1leviate inequality has to be scnltinised. The per capita figures, on the other hand, show an 
unambiguously rising inequality. Per capita GDP ofthe Pearl River De1ta was Rmb 1106.4 higher 
than that ofthe mountainous areas in 1985. The gap widened to Rmb 228 1.5 in 1990 and further 
to Rmb 12500 in 1994. During the same period, the difference between the average per capita 
savings deposits rose 仕om Rmb 548 to Rmb 2254 and then to Rmb 3135 ‘ One apparent cause of 
the imbalances has been the uneven allocation of resources. According to the figures of the 
regionallending of the five major ba叫(s and the rural credit cooperatives in Guangdong provided 
by Han Houyuan, the share of loans provided to the Pearl River Delta increased from 57.94% in 
1978 to 68.670/0 in 1989, while the share for the mountainous areas declined 企om 14.27% to 
12.52010. 12 
Th划is k必111吋d ofr閃e恥n叫al inlb削
e叫X泣tem剖 linl凶叫〈姆a咚ge 1臼s t忱he 111貝句紗j知or engine of growth, those areas that have poor endowments and 
unfavourable geographical locations are not attractive to outside investors. Relatively low 
economic gr仰O州叫叫h t伽h仙us凶S 昀m悶S叫ul叫t的吋S吟) 0伽n t伽h悅e 0咐t出h叫an叫 b忱郎ωa沁u凶昀S臼e of v叫e的句 W叫祕Cill帥t臼em叫叫 lin凶n凶1益的i
development of the唸 relatively ri記划ch areas could not have benefi飢t址te仗ωd the po∞orer areas, as both forward 
and backward linkage e旺ects across different regions within the province have almost been absent. 
VII. Future deveJopment strategies of Hong Kong and Guangdong 
As regards the future, both Hong Kong and Guangdong face a similar set of questions 
How to re-invest the “windfall profits" eamed in the past decade in a way that can benefit the most 
the future development of the economy? How to convert short-term and static advantages into 
long-tenn and dynamic advantages? During the process of change, how to contain or alleviate 
problems and negative side-effects that have arisen from structural imbalances? 
There are two mostly likely 臼ture tr句ectories for the Hong Kong economy: (1) Continue 
the “de-industrialization" process, without caring about the phenomenon of "hollowing 0叭" and 
allocate more resources in the development of the financial and sef\吐ce sectors. In this way, Hong 
Kong will develop into a world-class financial centre similar to New York and London. We have 
coined the tenn "Manhattanization" for Üús process. 13 (2) Follow a development strategy that 
emphasizes both financial services and manufacturìng industries with higher value-added and 
technologica1 content This requires the investment of the short-tenn profits rrom the China 
bonanza into the manufàcturing sector to upgrade technologies and to develop new industries 
Singapore and, to a less extent, Shanghai and Greater Tok:yo, are successful examples of 
12See Han Houyuan et al 、 "Guangdong chanye jiegou tiaozheng yu jinrong tizhi gaige" (production 
Structural Adjustment and Financial System Reform in Guangdong), Glωtωαn棺g必n棺g jinro~哼g 
(Gu肌1泊an咚gd伽on咚g Finance吋)， No. 1, 1991 , P仰p . 8-10叭~ and Ts翎an咚1嗨g Sh加u必，
Y.M. Yeωun咚1港g and D伽a趴盯訓，九Y泊v咐f而id K.Y. Chu (廿eds吋)， ωα仰n~μdo仰ngι: SI品ur川ν句吵J of歹/ α Province u仰n~拾跆r咚go仿in增'g Rapid 
Chαnge， The Chinese University Press, 1994, pp . 159咀 173
13See for example Tsang Shu必， I!The Economy", in Donald McMillan and Man Si-wai (eds.), 1he 
Other llong Kong Report 1994, The Chinese University Press, 1994, pp.125-148. 
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metropolises with industries. Obviously, the current trend in Hong Kong is to go along where 
"quick money" can be earned, i.e. down the first road of “Manhattanization". To switch to the 
second tr句的tory， a good deal of efforts, buttressed by long-terrn vision and courage, on the p訂t of 
the private sector as well as the government, is needed, which lamentably may be lacking around 
the 1997 political transition 
Down the path of Manhattanization, the problems that we discussed in section IV above, 
de-industria1ization, lack of technological progress, int1ation, worsening inequality etc., would tend 
to aggravate in Hong Kong 孔10reover，的 the Chinesc economy st剖ts to take 0宜: Hong Kong 
may have to undergo further "structural transformation" to keep ahead of other competing cities 
and regions in China, in particular Shanghai. ln the end, the territory could be forced into a peculiar 
mode of specialization, under which only actìvities of "high-risk, high-returns" find it viable to be 
based here. The trouble is that a limited proportion of the local population can engage profitably in 
these activities. Structural unemployment may replace labour shortage as a headache. Ironical妙，
Hong Kong will then be even more "Manhattanized" under such a scenario, as de-industrialization 
becomes total, financial wizardry dorninates, and the ugly reality of poverty in the midst of affiuence 
surfaces. The social consequences could be daunting. 14 
Some would argue that even total de-industrialization of Hong Kong is notrung to worry 
about. Why is it necessary for Hong Kong to have any manufacturing industries at all, while New 
Y ork does not have such industri郎， nor does London or Paris? The answer is simple: because 
Hong Kong, unlike these metropolises in relation to their home count旬， is supposed to be a 
separate economic system 企om the Chinese one under the J oint Declaration and the Basic Law 
After 1997, Hong Kong will continue to issue an independent curren句， keep its fiscal autonomy, 
and determine its own migration policy. So in theory the Hong Kong economy cannot be戶lly
integrated with the Chinese counterpart because there will not be totally 企ee flows of monetary, 
fiscal and human resources across the border The Hong Kong economy must maintain her own 
coherence 
Hong Kong residents cannot migrate to Guangdong in the same way as US citizens move 
from New Y ork to California. Hence, any local structural unemployment cannot be easily solved 
by an expedient transfer of human resources to the north. In the case of a fiscal or a balance-of-
payments 仰的， Beijing is not supposed to come to our rescue, at least not direct1y. We also have 
to look after our own inflation and distribution problems. I11 a nutshell, 110ng Kong is a very 
special case of regional economics. 
As a service economy, Hong Kong faces possible contraction in the internal and external 
demands for its services. Due to the rise of a number of service centres jn China, including 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai etc. , Hong kong is under some pressure, particularly as it 
has been criticized as being too expensive by Chinese sources (see below). However, and this 
14An earlier warning of this scenario was ftred by one of the authors. See Tsang Shu-ki, "The 
Economy" , in 刃le ()ther lfong Kong Report 1994, ibid 1994 was still a year when labour 
shortage was a problem. However, the situation changed drastically and in the second ha1f of 1995, 
Hong Kong saw a 10-year high in its unemployment rate at 3.60/0. Behind the problem were both 
cyclical and long-run factors 
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brings us back to Manhattanization again, Hong Kong in the u1timate analysis still has an edge over 
these competing cities because of its systemic advantage as a capitalist economy (guaranteed for 50 
years) vis-a-vis the "socialist market economy" of Shanghai and the like. There must be some 
financial and related activities which would be regarded as outright "speculative" or "non-
productive" by China, which the latter would not want to engage in and for which Hong Kong 
would exce1. In this sense, socialist China would still have to depend on capitalist Hong Kong. We 
can already observe that Hong Kong is taking a lead in the so called "derivatives revolution" in 
finance over China. This reinforces our argument that the territory may in the end be shifting into a 
peculiar mode of specialization that focuses on activities of a very "high-risk, high-returns" nature, 
under which structural employment could emerge as a problem 
As to internal demand for services, Hong Kong down the road of Manhattanization is likely 
to be constrained by the trend of widening income inequa1ity (see Table 5 above). It is well 
established in Marxian as wel1 as Keynesian economics that an expanding income gap would harm 
average consumption as the rich show a much lower marginal propensity to consume than the 
poor. A concentration of money in the former's hands inevitably results in weak sales of norma1 
goods; and in the extreme, leads to an "underconsumption crisis". As a small open economy, Hong 
Kong still would not be exempted from such a crisis, as domestic demands for non-tradables (包od，
housing, transportation etc.) are key pillars of the economy. Weak retail s祉es in Hong Kong for 
the past few years have alerted many to such a possibility, a1though again both cyclical and long-run 
factors have been at work.的
Hong Kong probably could learn more from the experience of city economies that aspire to 
maintain a balance between industry and service, such as Singapore and Shanghai. Singapore has 
even set a lower limit for the share of manufacturing in GDP at 25% (Hong Kong 祉ready we叫
down to 8.8% in 1995, as Table 1 shows); and Shanghai has unveiled ambitious plans to develop 
high-tech industries on its outskirts. So perhaps instead of b忱ec∞omi旭1誼ing the 
China, Hong Kong should servG as its 心ingapore" or "Shanghai". A possible mode of operation 
for Hong Kong's industries is the combination of China's capabilities in technological R & D with 
the territory's expertise in design, packaging, and commercialization. Genuine efforts need to be 
made to c1imb the technological ladder and to maintain a viable industria1 base, which will bring 
long-run benefits. It is foolhardy to abandon short-run comparative advantage. Trading and 
service sectors should no doubt be further promoted, but not one-sidedly. In any case, a balanced 
strategy like this can only be implemented through conscious effort by the authorities with regard to 
macroeconornic and microeconomic polici郎， as well as cooperation by the Chinese enterprises and 
the loca1 private sector 
In the recent past, the Hong Kong government seems to have become aware of the pitfalls 
of complete de-industrialization and letting short-termism prevai1. It has put some money into 
providing matching grants for private sector R & D; establishing technology centres, and most 
notably, embarking on the construction of a 字cience parl<". Without much fanfare, these moves 
represent a shift fonn the hands-off attitude of the past (which was often pronounced, but not 
15See Tsang Shu-ki, '.~Xianggangjingji wang hechu qu?" (Wither the Hong Kong Economy?), Ming 
PaoDai秒， Hong Kong, 15 November 1995. 
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strict1y followed anyway). Whether these moves will have any significant effect on the 
development of the Hong Kong economy, we èan only wait and see. 
As far as Guangdong is concemed, Manhattenization was not and never will be an option 
With a population of about 70 million, more than 10 times the size of Hong Kong, Guangdong 
cannot sweep aside manufacturing industries, or even agriculture (lest huge imports，企om other 
provinces or outside the country, will drain provincial resources heavily). On the other hand, 
services have no doubt been underdeveloped in Guangdong, in a relative sense at least, because of 
the traditional socialist bias and the rapid rise in living standards that raises demands. Overal1, 
Guangdong has to maintain a more balanced economic structure among the primary, secondary, 
and tertiary sectors, compared with Hong Kong 
ln 1978, the ratio among the three sectors in Guangdong was 29.9 : 46.4 : 23 . 7~ then it 
changed to 17.3 : 50.4 : 32.3 in 1993. 16 The surge ofmanufacturing industries in the province has 
been remarkable, but these industries þ'ave been troubled by two key problems: (1) Their 
technologicallevel was not high; and (21 There was an acute imbalance in sectoral structure, with 
the raw material and energy sub-sectors lagging seriously behind, thus constraining the 
lmprover削 in overall efficiency! 
Even under the one-sided outward orientation of the Guangdong economy in the past, 
some notable difficulties already emerged. One classic example is the province's foreign exchange 
imbalance in 1993. On the basis of customs statistics, Guangdong's exports in the year totalled 
US$27.03 billion while imports amounted to US$19.90 billion, hence producing a trade surplus of 
US$7 . 日 billion. However, according to an article on Guangdong jinro.楞， actual foreign exchange 
receipt from exports tumed out to be oIÙy US$7 billion whereas the ac仙al usage of foreign 
exchange for imports was US$10.4 billion. So a deflcit ofUS$3 .4 billion resulted, and "had to be 
solved by going through the swap centres". 17 The deviation of the trade-related foreign exchange 
balance from the recorded trade balance is well known in China because of various forms of 
leakages and statistical discrepancies. 18 Nevertheless, the very low receipt rate 企om expo討s (oIÙy 
26%), compared with the import utilization rate of 52%, was striking even by Chinese standards. 
( The low receipt of f必伽忱b址r昀叫e
Guangdo∞ng economy as a large number of f必or昀elψgt伊n-叫invested enterprises uses the province as an 
outward processing zone, with the resu1t that the ratio of value-added accrued to Guangdong 
remaîns small. ) Imports of agricult叫 produces， raw and semi-processed materials and 0伽
16Calculated in current prices from figures in Guangdong tongji nianjian 1994 (Guangdong 
Statistical Yearbook 1994) 
17Li Dan-er, "Jius凶i站凶S訂1 J戶j
Financial Ref臼伽b切rm 0∞n the Gua組ngμdon啥1毯g Ec∞O∞nomy抄)， Guangdong jingrong (Guangdong Fînance), 
No.6, 1994, pp.4-6 
18See, for example, Tsang Sh小姐， "Towards Full Convertibility? China's Foreign Exchange 
Reforms" , China Information, Vol.眩， no.1 , 1994, pp.1-4 1. 
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industrial products, on the other hand, continue to drain valuable financial resources 企om the 
provmce 
The cold reality is that Guangdong faces di:fficulties even in ba1ancing its foreign exchange 
under the operational mode of"shop at the 企0肘， factory at the back". Therefo間， Guangdong must 
apparent1y do two things: (1) enhance the value-added of its production; and (2) develop a more 
balanced industrial structure with a higher degree of intemaI linkage and coordination 
The Guangdong authorities appear to have been aware of these problems. With a series of 
policy statements and measures announced in the past few years, the province has acωally 
embarked on a course of economic upgrading, that is in marked contrast with the "liberal" , "non-
interventionist" stance of the Hong Kong govemment. An industriaI policy has emerged in the 
province, under which strategic industries including petro-chemical, automobile, electronics, 
metallurgy, constructÏon material, textiles and drugs are targetted for promotion. On the other 
hand, a p]an for regional division of labour with the province has a1so been nurtured, with the 
westem region specializing in faw material, energy and heavy industries and the eastem region 
focussing on light and consumer goods indust.ries. The centre, in particular Guangzhou, would 
spearhead the effort to develop services.19 
This newly emerging economic strategy is encouraging, but its concrete implementation 
would certainly require more than just 0伍cial pronouncements. What is needed is a more rational 
structuring of both industrial and locational pattems within the pro札nce， with a view to promote 
intemal linkage, division of labour and cooperation as well as technological upgrading. Moreover, 
structural duplication and wastage of resources must be minimized, especially with regard to 
infrastructural developments, a hot issue in the 1990s 
、llll. The future mode of economic Iink.age ofHong Kong and Guangdong 
Obviously~ the economic linkage between H9ng Kong 如d Guangdong should be upgraded \ 
in the future. Instead of continuing the oldmode of("the shop at the 合0肘， the factory 的 the back" \ 
operating at a more or less stagnant teclu1010gicalle~] of "the shop", a new mode of mu1ti-sphere ../ 
and mu1ti-dirnensional interfaces and cooperation is needed. Greater effort should be spent on 
creating long-term competitive advantage 
No matter what development paths lIong Kong and Guangdong will follow and no matter 
what changes in the economic structure will take place in the two places, improvement in 
m企astructure will be a cIUcial factor detennining the rate of growth. 1n the 1980s, Guangdong to a 
very large extent had made use ofIlong Kong's intrastructural facilities to conduct extemal trade, 
的 shown in Table 3 above. 1nto the 1990s, like other provinces, Guangdong has emphasized the 
19The major policy documents are compiled in Wang Dingchang (ed.), Er ling yí ling nían dí 
Guangdong: guíhua ji zhanlu.e ya旬的 (Guangdong in 2010: Planning and Strategic Studies), 
Guangdong People's Publishing flouse, 1994 
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construction of infrastructure so as to relieve the bottleneck sectors and to sustain high economic 
growth. On the other hand, if Hong Kong is to develop further, infrastructural facilities have also 
to be strengthened. One problem that has emerged is that in order to be cost effective and e伍cient，
m企astructural constructions in Hong Kong and Guangdong, inc1uding airports, ports, h:ighways, 
railways, energy and environmental protection projects, should be coordinated 
Owing to the lack of vision on the part of Hong Kong government and Sino-British 
conflicts over 1997, the construction of some important infrastIuctural facilities (particularly the 
newalrpo此， additional container terminals and related transpo抗 systems) has been delayed in Hong 
Kong. Hence, Hong Kong is in the danger offailing to satisfy the fast-growing demand from China 
in general, and 企om Guangdong in particular. Seen from this angle, Guangdong should no doubt 
expand its own capacities in airports, ports, railways and even water transpo此， so as to reduce its 
reliance on Hong Kong. 
Another factor is of course the surging charges of re-exports and voyage services in Hong 
Kong. According to an analysis of China's General Customs, total profits earned by Hong Kong 
businesses (inc1uding Chinese and foreign companies registered in Hong Kong) 企om servmg re-
exports to and 仕om China rose 企om US$5 . 4 bi11ion in 1980 to US$14. 5 billion in 1993 . The 
average gross profit margin thus rose 企om 21 % to 31 %>?O Other studies also point to some 
worrying statistics. For example, the handling fee for one container ranges from HK$1200 to 
HK$1800, which is 5 to 7 times that of the normal fee in Mainland China, one-third to one half 
higher than that charged by Singapore, and double that of Kaohsung in Taiwan?l The underlying 
cause is not just the imbalance between supply and demand, but also the existence of market power 
among the small number of operators in Hong Kong. Even if Hong Kong speeds up the 
construction of infrastructural facilities in the future, re-exporting charges are unlikely to fall, unless 
China and other places can generate e能ctive cOlnpetition. 
To this, there could be two entirely different kinds of response. The first one is an 
insensitivity to the situation. The traditional mode of planning and construction of transportation 
system in the 1980s could still be followed - with major routes all pointing 企om north to south, 
converging to Hong Kong. The underlying assumption is that Hong Kong should still be the major 
po此 for Chinese imports and exports in the future. 
Another k:ind of response is( a large scale of "diversion" of the congested transportation 
system in Guangdong) In the euphona after the "Deng whirlwind" of 1992, various localities have 
been striving to build their own airports, railways, po討s， highways, voyage and communication 
facilities, often with minimal coordination among themselves. Taking airports as an example, as 
pointed out by Professor Zheng Tianxiang of Zhongshan University, the new airports in Hong 
Kong, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen all have an ultimate annual capacity of 80 million person-times, 
while the airports of Zhuhai and Macau have a designed annual capacity of 1.2 million and 8 million 
20Reported by Shαnghai jingji bαo (Shanghai Economic News), 24 June 1994, p.1 
21 Zheng Tianxiang, "Yue-Gang jichu sheshi jianshe 泊的ao guanjian" (My Views on the 
Coordination of In企astructural Construction between Guangdong and Hong Kong), Gang-Ao 
jingji yuebao (Hong Kong Macao Economic Month1y), October 1994. 
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respeçtively. Besides, there is the extension or establishment of airports in Foshan, We也hou，
Xiaxing and Jiangmen. Therefo悶， eventually, nine airports will thrive in the Pearl River Delta, with 
a total annual capacity of 280 mi1lion person-times, which will be about 9 times of the projected 
population in the region. ln contrast, the Kai Tak International Airport of Hong Kong had a tota1 
capacity equivalent to only 4 times of the population in the territOry in 1993 . Whether there is 
sufficient demand to support all the nine airports in the fu仙re is a big question.22 
Obviously, both types of responses are inappropriate. To be cost-effective, there should be 
coordination in the construction of infrastructural facilities between Hong Kong and Guangdong 
and within Guangdong itself, so as to avoid duplication and waste on the one hand, and to make 
use ofeconomies of scale and to enhance efficiency on the other. 
As for the issue of technological upgrading in industries, cooperation between Hong Kong 
and Guangdong will probably not be at a very high level. As discussed above, the choices facing 
Hong Kong are either (1) “Ma他attanization" or (2) the “combination of financial services and high 
value-added manufacturing industries". The technological upgrading of Guangdong will, in theory, 
induce Hong Kong to follow the second path. However, as discussed above, the industries that 
Guangdong is planning to develop inc1ude petrol-chemical, automobile, electronics, metallurgical, 
construction material, textiles, and pharmaceutical industries etc. Among them, Hong Kong has 
some advantage only in electronics, textiles and perhaps construction material. Hong Kong' s 
industrialization was traditionally based on light industries. Thus, to promote the industries it has 
targetted, Guangdong should go beyond just cooperation with Hong Kong. Closer ties to 
European and other East Asian countries, which have comparative advantage in these fields, should 
be developed. What Hong Kong can help is probably just to provide capital, infonnation and some 
connectlons 
At the end of 1994, an official of Guangdong's Commission for Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade was cited by a Hong Kong newspaper as saying,“Guangdong will coordinate 
its economic development with the industrial transformation of Hong Kong. Development centres 
for high technologies will be established together. Through Hong Kong, findings of foreign 
research on high technologies will be absorbed and extension to product development and sa1es will 
be made. Production and industrial structures will be adjusted in an optimal way."23 To us, this 
viewpoint is too optimistic and the description of the economic relationship between Hong Kong 
and Guangdong too idealistic. The contribution of Hong Kong to Guangdong' s development of 
high-technology industries should not be over-estirnated. Hong Kong does not have notable 
advantage in this aspect. The development, transfer and absorption of high-technology industries 
are usually effective only through ac心al investment and production. Will it not be more effective 
and efficient for Guangdong to absorb foreign technology by dealing with foreign p訂tners directly 
than through the intermediation ofHong Kong? 
As regards financial servÎces and other tertiary industries, the cooperation between the two 
places is rather complicated. Hong Kong, as a "first-mover", should be able to contribute more to 
22 See Zheng Tianxiang, "Yue-Gang jichu sheshi jianshe 泊etiao gu叫ian" ， ibid 
23 Hong Kong United Dai令， 19 November 1994, p.21 
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Guangdong than the development of high technology industries. This is particularly true in 
financing. Guangdong can raise funds by issuing bonds and stocks in Hong Kong's financia1 
markets. Hong Kong' s expertise in this area can also facilitate the development of financia1 and 
other services in the province. Yet, there will still be a high degree of competition. As far as high-
level financia1 services are concemed, China has already got Shanghai which will soon be at par 
with Hong Kong. The roles of financia1 services among Guan評hou， Shenzhen, and Zhuh缸， which 
all aspire to be "intemationa1 financia1 centres", should be planned and coordinated. It will be 
stretching credibility too far to advocate that southem China can host four "intemationa1 financial 
centres" in the true sense. 
Competition between Hong Kong and Guangdong also exists in trade-related services. 
When Guangdong has expanded its capacity in airports, ports and other transportation facilities, 
accumulated su伍cient human resources and experiences, its reliance on Hong Kong will be 
reduced. Part of Hong Kong' s re-exporting business will be “diverted" to other places in 
Guangdong. The problems of congestion and "over-charging" in Hong Kong will on1y reinforce 
the trend 
N evertheless, Hong Kong and Guangdong are not playing a “zero-sum game" . Under 
virtuous competition, it may become a "variable-sum game" and a “win-win" outcome is possible. 
Taking trading as an example, there has already been the suggestion that Hong Kong and 
Guangdong should cooperate in building an e伍cient transportation network, which can be 
extended to other provinces in middle China. 1n this way, some of the foreign trade businesses in 
the middle regions of the Yangzi River can be channelled southward to the Pearl River Delta, 
bene且tting Guangdong as well as Hong Kong. 
IX. Concluding remarks 
In the ultimate analysis, the developmenta1 path of either Hong Kong or Guangdong is not 
entirely determined by the mode of economic linkage between the two economies. In Hong Kong, 
questions such as whether Manhattanization is the choice or whether a more balanced production 
structure should be nurtured are hard ones that must be answered by local entrepreneurs and the 
government, a1though as we analyzed above, it is not easy to transcend beyond the temptations of 
easy money and short-term profits that have arisen from the opening of China and the regio叫 re­
allocation of resources. As to Guangdong, a much larger entity with even more complicated 
factors affecting economic development, the pursuance of a balanced strategy and regional 
coordination is a very difficu1t art. Hong Kong's assistance in this aspect can only be 幽泊ted.
As to the negative side-effects and problems of the bonanza of the past fifteen years, such 
as inf1ation, regional and income disparity, "hollowing out" etc., Hong Kong and Guangdong will 
have to deal with them independently through suitable policies and remedial measures. 
These conclusions are not meant to undermine the importance of the economic linkage 
between Guangdong and Hong Kong. The short-term benefits that it has brought about have been 
tremendous to both sides, and we have analyzed them in some details in this paper. Our message is 
----, 
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indeed simple: while the mutua11y beneficial mechanisrns should be maintained and improved, there 
is a strong need to develop Jong-term competitiveness and dynamic advantage, a task which is 
likely to ca11 for more independent efforts on the pa討 of Hong Kong and Guangdong than in the 
past decade. Hence, a certain distancing in economic relationship is hea1thy 
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